Abstract:In this paper, I evaluate the possibility of convergence between animal welfare and environmental ethics. By surveying the most prominent views within each of these respective camps, I argue that animal welfare ethics and ecological theories in environmental ethics are incommensurable in virtue of their respective individualistic and holistic value theories. I conclude by arguing that this conceptual clarification allows us to see that animal welfare ethics can nevertheless be made commensurable with theories in environmental ethics according to which value (...) primarily resides in individuals, rather than in collectives and communities. (shrink)

This paper considers the use that Plato makes of the Principle of Non-Contradiction in his engagements with eristic refutations. By examining Plato’s use of the principle in his most detailed engagements with eristic—in the Sophist, the discussion of “agonistic” argumentation in the Theaetetus, and especially the Euthydemus—I aim to show that the pressure exerted on Plato by eristic refutations played a crucial role in his development of the PNC, and that the principle provided him with a much more sophisticated means (...) of demarcating philosophical argumentation from eristic than he is generally thought to have. In particular, I argue that Plato’s qualified formulation of the PNC restricts the class of genuine contradictions in such a way that reveals the contradictions that eristics produce through their refutations to be merely apparent and that Plato consistently appeals to his qualified conception of genuine contradiction in his encounters with eristics in order to demonstrate that their refutations are merely apparent. The paper concludes by suggesting that the conception of genuine contradiction afforded by the PNC did not just provide Plato with a way of demarcating genuine from eristic refutations, but also with an answer to substantive philosophical challenges that eristics raised through their refutations. (shrink)

In this book, Matthew Duncombe argues that Plato, Aristotle, certain Stoics, and Sextus Empiricus each held a broadly "constitutive" view of relativity. According to constitutive accounts, a "relative" is constituted by the relation that it bears to its "correlative". Such treatments of relativity sharply contrast with more familiar nonconstitutive accounts, according to which standing in some relation suffices for being a relative. On such a view, versions of which many scholars have assumed to be at work in antiquity, Alcibiades counts (...) as a relative because he is related to Socrates through the "is more beautiful than" relation. On... (shrink)